Prior research shows that restrictive zoning regulations are major drivers of rising housing costs and residential segregation in the United States. In response, a growing number of state and local governments are passing laws to allow for denser housing in strictly zoned localities, despite entrenched opposition from incumbent residents. This paper examines whether incumbent residents' responses undermine the success of these policies by studying new construction permitted under Massachusetts Chapter 40B; one of the longest-standing and most productive examples of a housing policy that bypasses local zoning laws. Exploiting hyperlocal variation in residents' proximity to new 40B buildings, we find that only a subset of larger 40B developments cause property values to decrease, and that this effect is both highly localized and only emerges in the longer term, many years after these developments are proposed. Focusing on these larger developments that are more likely to elicit resident reactions, we find that only a fraction of incumbent residents move out after their approval and that the magnitude of these migration responses is insufficient to undermine policymakers' desegregation goals. We also do not find evidence that incumbent residents become more politically active against future development, as they are no more likely to vote in local or general elections nor are they more likely to vote for repealing Chapter 40B after 40B developments are proposed near their homes.

The Housing Choice Voucher program provides substantial rental subsidies to low-income households, yet many recipients struggle to secure housing with their vouchers, particularly in low-poverty areas. This paper examines a key bottleneck in the program: landlord discrimination against voucher holders. Using a nationwide dataset from a major online rental platform, we identify listings that explicitly seek or reject voucher holders. We find significant variation across metropolitan areas, with voucher-seeking listings ranging from nearly zero to 18 percent and voucher-rejecting listings ranging from nearly zero to 28 percent. Within metros, landlords in high-poverty neighborhoods with larger Black and voucher populations are more likely to seek voucher holders, while rejection of voucher holders is relatively more common in low-poverty neighborhoods. Using a difference-in-differences design, we provide causal evidence that statewide prohibitions on source-of-income discrimination significantly reduce voucher-rejecting listings, especially in low-poverty neighborhoods, effectively eliminating cross-neighborhood differences in discriminatory behavior.